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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78A-4-103(2)0) (2009). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the District Court correctly determine, as a matter of law, that the State did not 
breach the lease agreement between the parties, because the State had the right under the 
agreement to adjust annual rents based on fair market value for the highest and best use 
of the subject property? (R. 2079). 
Standard of Review 
When reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn from them are viewed in a light most favorable to the non-
prevailing party. Wayment v. Clear Channel Broadcasting Inc., 116 P.3d 271 (Utah 
2005). "The district court's legal decisions are granted no deference on summary 
judgment and the court reviews them for correctness." Fericks v. Lucy Ann Soffe Trust, 
100 P.3d 1200 (Utah 2004). 
II. Did the District Court correctly determine, as a matter of law, that because the 
State was entitled under the lease to adjust annual rentals to fair market rental value, 
appellant Cook Associates, Inc. was not entitled to assert derivative claims for breach of 
the covenants of good faith and fair dealing and quiet enjoyment, and regulatory takings, 
based on the State's right to readjust lease rentals. 
Standard of Review 
Same as above. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES OF CENTRAL 
IMPORTANCE TO THE APPEAL 
Federal Statutes 
Utah Enabling Act (Act of July 16,1894, ch. 138,28 Stat 107) 
Sec. 6. [Land grant for common schools.] 
That upon the admission of said State into the Union, sections numbered two, 
sixteen, thirty-two, and thirty-six in every township of said proposed state . . . are hereby 
granted to said State for the support of common schools . . . 
Utah Constitution 
Article XX, Section 2. [School and institutional trust lands.] 
Lands granted to the State under Sections 6, 8, and 12 of the Utah Enabling Act, 
and other lands which may be added to those lands pursuant to those sections through 
purchase, exchange, or other means, are declared to be school and institutional trust 
lands, held in trust by the State for the respective beneficiaries and purposes stated in the 
Enabling Act grants. 
Utah Statutes 
53C-1-102 Purpose. 
(1) (a) The purpose of this title is to establish an administration and board to 
manage lands that Congress granted to the state for the support of common schools and 
other beneficiary institutions, under the Utah Enabling Act. 
(b) This grant was expressly accepted in the Utah Constitution, thereby creating a 
compact between the federal and state governments which imposes upon the state a 
perpetual trust obligation to which standard trust principles are applied. 
(c) Title to these trust lands is vested in the state as trustee to be administered for 
the financial support of the trust beneficiaries. 
(2) (a) The trust principles referred to in Subsection (1) impose fiduciary duties 
upon the state, including a duty of undivided loyalty to, and a strict requirement to 
administer the trust corpus for the exclusive benefit of, the trust beneficiaries. 
(b) As trustee, the state must manage the lands and revenues generated from the 
lands in the most prudent and profitable manner possible, and not for any purpose 
inconsistent with the best interests of the trust beneficiaries. 
(c) The trustee must be concerned with both income for the current beneficiaries 
and the preservation of trust assets for future beneficiaries, which requires a balancing of 
short and long-term interests so that long-term benefits are not lost in an effort to 
maximize short-term gains. 
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(d) The beneficiaries do not include other governmental institutions or agencies, 
the public at large, or the general welfare of this state. 
(3) This title shall be liberally construed to enable the board of trustees, the 
director, and the administration to faithfully fulfill the state's obligations to the trust 
beneficiaries. 
53C-1-302. Management of the administration — Trust responsibilities. 
(1) (a) The director has broad authority to: 
(i) manage the School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration in fulfillment 
of its purpose; and 
(ii) establish fees, procedures, and rules consistent with general policies prescribed 
by the board of trustees. 
(b) The procedures and rules shall: 
(i) be consistent with the Utah Enabling Act, the Utah Constitution, and policies of 
the board; 
(ii) reflect undivided loyalty to the beneficiaries consistent with the director's 
fiduciary duties and responsibilities; 
(iii) subject to Subsection (2), obtain the optimum values from use of trust lands 
and revenues for the trust beneficiaries, including the return of not less than fair market 
value for the use, sale, or exchange of school and institutional trust assets; and 
(iv) be broadly construed to grant the board, director, and administration full 
discretionary authority to manage, maintain, or dispose of trust assets in the manner they 
consider most favorable to the beneficiaries. 
(2) The director shall seek to optimize trust land revenues consistent with the 
balancing of short and long-term interests, so that long-term benefits are not lost in an 
effort to maximize short-term gains. 
(3) The director shall maintain the integrity of the trust and prevent, through 
prudent management, the misapplication of its lands and revenues. 
53C-1-304. Rules to ensure procedural due process — Board review of director 
action — Judicial review. 
(1) The board shall make rules to ensure procedural due process in the resolution 
of complaints concerning actions by the board, director, and the administration. 
(2) An aggrieved party to a final action by the director or the administration may 
petition the board for administrative review of the decision. 
(3) (a) The board may appoint a qualified hearing examiner for purposes of taking 
evidence and making recommendations for board action. 
(b) The board shall consider the recommendations of the examiner in making 
decisions. 
(4) (a) The board shall uphold the decision of the director or the administration 
unless it finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the decision violated applicable 
law, policy, or rules. 
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(b) The board shall base its final actions on findings and conclusions and shall 
inform the aggrieved party of its right to judicial review. 
(5) An aggrieved party to a final action by the board may obtain judicial review of 
that action under Sections 63G-4-402 and 63G-4-403. 
63G-4-40L Judicial review — Exhaustion of administrative remedies. 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, except in 
actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute. 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative 
remedies available, except that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative remedies if this 
chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not required; 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to 
exhaust any or all administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the 
public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion. 
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action within 
30 days after the date that the order constituting the final agency action is issued or is 
considered to have been issued under Subsection 63G-4-302(3)(b). 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate parties as 
respondents and shall meet the form requirements specified in this chapter. 
Administrative Rules 
Utah Admin Code R. 850-30-400 (2007). 
1. Lease rates shall be based on the market value and income producing 
capability of the subject property and may be determined by: 
(a) multiplying the market value of the subject property by the current agency-
determined interest rate; 
(b) the evaluation and use of comparable lease data; or 
(c) using either a fixed rate per acre or a crop-share formula for agricultural 
leases providing that the rental rate is customary and reasonable. 
2. The agency may base lease rentals on a value other than the market value of 
the subject property, provided that the director determines such is in the best interest 
of the beneficiaries and provided that the lease contains a clause whereby the agency 
may terminate the lease prior to the end of the lease term. 
3. In addition to lease rental, the agency may require the payment of percentage 
rents. 
4. The agency, pursuant to board policy, may establish a minimum lease rental 
based on the costs incurred in administering the leases, and a desired minimum rate 
of return. 
4 
5. Lease Review Procedures and Rental Adjustments for Special Use Leases. 
(a) Special use leases shall be reviewed by the agency as of the effective date 
specified in the respective lease and such review may result in an adjustment of base 
rental. 
(b) Adjustments in base rentals may be based upon changes in market value 
including appreciation of the subject properties, changes in established indices, or 
other methods which may be appropriate and in the best interest of the trust 
beneficiaries. The determination of which method to use may be based upon an 
analysis of the cost effectiveness of performing the review. 
(c) When using established indices, the rate of adjustment shall be based on the 
indices established for the years involved in the review period, unless the rate of 
adjustment exceeds a maximum adjustment rate, or fails to reach a minimum rate of 
adjustment as specified in the respective lease. If no maximum adjustment rate or 
minimum rate of increase is specified in the lease, then the percent change will 
increase or decrease according to the above described rate of adjustment. 
(d) The index used in the review may be the applicable component of the CPI-U 
or any other index determined by the agency to be appropriate. 
(e) The adjusted rental amount as determined pursuant to this rule shall be 
rounded to the nearest number evenly divisible by $10. 
(f) The director may suspend, defer, or waive the adjustment of base rentals in 
specific instances, based on a written finding that the suspension, deferral, or waiver 
is in the best interest of the trust beneficiaries. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves interpretation of a contract provision that allows the State to 
make periodic adjustments of annual rentals under a ground lease of state school trust 
lands entered between the State, acting through the School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Administration ("SITLA") as lessor, and appellant Cook Associates, Inc., dba Cook 
Slurry Company, a Utah corporation ("Cook"), as lessee. 
On June 13, 1978, the State of Utah, acting through the Division of State Lands & 
Forestry ("DSL&F"), and Cook executed Special Use Lease Agreement ("SULA") 418, a 
ground lease of state school trust lands near Lehi, Utah County (the "Lease"). The lease 
authorized Cook to use the leased premises for an explosives manufacturing plant. In 
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1994, SITLA succeeded DSL&F as statutory manager of Utah's state trust lands and as 
Lessor under the Lease. 
Paragraph 11 of the Lease contains the following provision concerning periodic 
adjustment of lease rentals: 
Lessee agrees that Lessor shall have the right to adjust the 
annual rentals hereunder at the end of each five (5) year 
period as Lessor shall deem to be reasonably necessary in the 
best interest of the State. 
SITLA's periodic readjustments of special use lease rentals are governed by Utah Admin. 
Code R. 850-30-400(5) (2009). This rule provides for rental adjustments based upon 
changes in the fair market value of the leased property, including appreciation in property 
values or changes in established price indices. 
Pursuant to Paragraph 11, the State timely exercised its option to adjust Cook's 
rent in 1993 and 1998 based on changes in the consumer price index. SITLA attempted 
to readjust rentals a third time in 2004, this time based upon a new independent appraisal 
demonstrating a large increase in the underlying land value of the leased lands. However, 
no change in the rent amount was implemented at that time because Cook 
administratively challenged the timeliness of SITLA's exercise of Paragraph 11. After 
formal adjudicative proceedings before the SITLA Board of Trustees, the Board 
determined that SITLA's verbal communications with Cook regarding the proposed rent 
adjustment did not comprise timely notice to Cook of the rental adjustment (which had 
been due in 2003), and reversed the adjustment (R. 0298-0319). 
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In both the interval prior to the proposed 2003 rental adjustment and subsequently, 
land values in northern Utah County increased dramatically. The independent appraisal 
of the property in connection with the proposed 2004 adjustment indicated the substantial 
encroachment of suburban development to the boundaries of the property, with values 
rising accordingly. During this period, SITLA and Cook disagreed on the interpretation 
of Paragraph 11 and the associated administrative rules governing rent adjustments. 
SITLA contended that R. 850-30-400 and Paragraph 11 allowed it to consider the highest 
and best use of the property in setting adjusted rentals. Cook asserted to the contrary that 
"SITLA is required to determine the FMV of the property for purposes of any rent 
increase by reference to the leasehold used for the next 20 years as an explosives facility" 
(R. 0004). 
Cook initiated litigation against SITLA in the Fourth District Court on October 30, 
2006, alleging four causes of action (R. 001-008). Cook's claims stemmed from 
SITLA's purported intent to timely exercise Paragraph 11 at the next option period 
(2008) in accordance with the fair market value of the land under Lease (R. 001-008); 
however, Cook did not file an administrative action in 2008 to appeal the actual rental 
adjustment. In the subject litigation, Cook asserted causes of action for breach of 
contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of the covenant of 
quiet enjoyment and inverse condemnation as a result of SITLA's past attempt and future 
intent to exercise Paragraph 11 (R. 0004-0006). Cook alleged that certain acts of SITLA, 
which purportedly occurred between 2002 and October 2006, constituted bad acts and 
contributed to the breaches and/or taking. These "bad acts" included: (1) the alleged 
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attempt to either sell or develop, subject to the Lease, the school trust lands under Lease; 
(2) the alleged "slander" of Cook in the business community; (3) purported "threats" to 
Cook concerning an imminent rent increase; and (4) the refusal to accept Cook's proposal 
to participate in the sale or development of the land under Lease and subsequently split 
the profits associated with the disposition of school trust lands. (R. 0005-0007, 0476-
0480). 
Upon completion of discovery, SITLA moved the District Court for summary 
judgment on March 25, 2008 (R. 0210-0550). SITLA asserted that the terms of 
Paragraph 11 unambiguously granted SITLA the option to adjust rents as SITLA deems 
will serve the best interest of the State. As it pertains to management of school trust 
lands, the best interest of the State is governed by the Utah Constitution, the Utah Trust 
Lands Management Act, and applicable administrative rules. SITLA's contended that its 
exercise of Paragraph 11 to raise rents to reflect the appraised fair market rental value of 
the underlying lands, in the manner set forth by applicable rules, was a lawful exercise of 
a bargained-for contractual right, and could not support Cook's claims of breach of 
contract. 
On May 5, 2008, Cook also filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 1212-
1266). Cook's motion did not contend that there were any material facts in dispute which 
would have precluded the grant of summary judgment to the State. Rather, Cook 
attempted to introduce various new claims, based upon a variety of inadmissible 
evidence, all appearing for the first time notwithstanding the close of discovery some 
months before (R. 1428-1537). SITLA moved to strike various inadmissible evidence. 
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See Defendant's Motions to Strike Portions of the Affidavit of Merrill Cook (R. 1340-
1362); also see Defendant's Motion to Strike the Affidavits of Dee G. Atkin and 
Thaddeus Speed (R. 1366-1420). 
After oral argument on the pending motions, the District Court ruled on January 
22, 2009 that the contract between the parties unambiguously gave the State the right to 
readjust rentals based on the highest and best use of the property. The Court found that, 
because the contract granted the right to readjust, Cook's derivative claims of breach of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, 
anticipatory breach, and inverse condemnation could not be maintained (R. 2076-2083). 
The Court then found that the remaining motions concerning admissibility of various 
Cook affidavits were moot. The Court entered a final order on March 17, 2009, granting 
summary judgment to the SITLA and denying Cook's reciprocal motion for summary 
judgment (R. 2149-2154). Cook filed a timely Notice of Appeal, dated April 1, 2009 (R. 
2155-2157). 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS RELEVANT TO 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
SITLA and the School Trust 
1. The School and Institutional Trust Lands Administration ("SITLA") is an 
independent state agency created by Utah Code Ann. § 53C-1-101 e/ seq. to administer 
lands granted by the United States to the State of Utah by the Utah Enabling Act, Act of 
July 16, 1894, 28 Stat. 107, for the express purposes enumerated in the Enabling Act. 
9 
2. At statehood, the Enabling Act granted certain lands to the State with the 
condition that all revenue flowing from such trust lands be used for the support of the 
State's public schools and other beneficiary institutions. Utah Enabling Act, Act of July 
16, 1894, 28 Stat. 107 at Sec. 6, 8, 10 and 12. 
3. The Utah Constitution imposes the duty of trustee on the State, acting by 
and through SITLA, in administering state trust lands. UT Const., art. X, §§5 and 7, and 
art. XX, §2. 
4. The Utah Legislature has granted SITLA authority to exercise discretion to 
manage state trust lands and promulgate rules in fulfillment of its purposes. Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 53C-l-102(2)(b) (1994), 53C-4-101 (1997), and 53C-l-302(l)-(2) (1997). 
The Subject Property 
5. The state school trust lands which are the subject of this action (the 
"Subject Property") are located in Utah County and more fully described as: 
Township 6 South, Range 1 West, SLB&M 
Section 11: N2, W2SW4, N2SE4 
(R. 0544). 
6. SITLA manages the Subject Property on behalf of the State pursuant to the 
Utah Enabling Act, the Utah Constitution, Utah statutes, and applicable regulations, for 
the benefit of the trust beneficiaries, in this case Utah's K-12 public schools (R. 0544). 
The Lease 
7. Cook and the State entered into Special Use Lease Agreement No. 418 on 
June 13, 1978 ("1978 Lease"). The 1978 Lease was amended in 1988 to include a 475 
acres comprising a buffer zone already in place ("1988 Amendment"). The 1978 Lease 
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and 1988 Amendment are hereafter collectively referred to as the "Lease" (R. 0463-
0469). 
The Rental Adjustment Clause 
8. Paragraph 11 of the Lease states: 
Lessee agrees that Lessor shall have the right to adjust the 
annual rentals hereunder at the end of each five (5) year 
period as Lessor shall deem to be reasonably necessary in the 
best interest of the State. 
(R. 0468). 
Administrative Rule Governing Lease Review 
9. Utah Admin. Code R. 850-30-400 (2007), which governs special use lease 
rates and establishes the acceptable methodology by which SITLA calculates rental 
adjustments, provides in relevant part: 
Lease Review Procedures and Rental Adjustments for Special Use Leases. 
(a) Special use leases shall be reviewed by the agency 
as of the effective date specified in the respective lease and 
such review may result in an adjustment of base rental. 
(b) Adjustments in base rentals may be based upon 
changes in market value including appreciation of the subject 
properties, changes in established indices, or other methods 
which may be appropriate and in the best interest of the trust 
beneficiaries. The determination of which method to use may 
be based upon an analysis of the cost effectiveness of 
performing the review. 
(R. 0544-0545). 
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2004: No Rental Adjustment 
10. Cook appealed the timeliness of SITLA's action of May 27, 2004, to 
exercise its 2003 option pursuant to Paragraph 11 of the Lease and adjust rental rates (R. 
0320-0326). 
11. SITLA's Board of Trustees concluded that "Cook was not given the 
required notice by the relevant anniversary date" and that SITLA "was required to 
exercise its option to adjust the SULA 418 rents in a timely fashion, or this right was 
waived." As such, no rental adjustment was implemented in 2004 (R. 0298-0319). 
2006: Cook Lawsuit Against SITLA 
12. On July 20, 2005, Mr. Thomas A. Mitchell, counsel for SITLA, sent 
correspondence to Mr. Blake S. Atkin, counsel for Cook, regarding SITLA's future intent 
to conduct a review of the rental rate pursuant to its option under Paragraph 11 of the 
Lease "to adjust the rent to provide for a return to the trust of an amount equal to market 
value as of the date of the five-year review . . . [and SITLA's willingness] to discuss 
alternatives along the lines proposed in the past" (R. 0295). 
13. Cook filed the Complaint on October 30, 2006, claiming breach of Lease 
and inverse condemnation, and seeking declaratory judgment of SITLA's rights to 
determine fair market value pursuant to Paragraph 11 of the Lease, based on Cook's 
limited leasehold interest (R. 001-008). 
14. SITLA objects to Paragraphs 6, 18, and 19 of Appellant's Statement of 
Undisputed Facts because they were disputed and subject to Motions to Strike which 
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Motions were rendered moot by the District Court's Decision on appeal (R. 1340-1362, 
R. 1366-1420). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The District Court correctly held as a matter of law that Paragraph 11 of the Lease 
unambiguously granted the State of Utah, through SITLA, the right to adjust rentals 
under the lease as it deemed reasonably necessary, to reflect the full fair market rental 
value of the subject property. Because SITLA was contractually entitled to raise rent to 
reflect the increase in market value of the land, Cook's derivative claims that the 
proposed adjustment constituted an anticipatory repudiation of the lease, a breach of the 
covenants of good faith and fair dealing or quiet enjoyment, or some sort of regulatory 
taking all fail as a matter of law. Utah law governing the interpretation of contracts, as 
set forth m Dairies v. Vincent, 2008 UT 51, f31, 190 P. 3d 1269, 1277 (Utah 2008), 
provides that a party's competing interpretation of contractual language may be accepted 
only if that interpretation is reasonably supported by the language of the contract. Cook 
asserts parol evidence to argue a position not reasonably supported by the language of the 
contract, i.e. that the State's right to readjust is limited to the value of Cook's use of the 
property for an explosives plant and buffer zone, rather than its highest and best use (in 
this case for residential subdivision development). There is nothing in the lease language 
that supports Cook's position, so the District Court correctly ruled in SITLA's favor as a 
matter of law. 
The parol evidence relied upon by Cook is also clearly inadmissible. Cook's 
appeal relies on three affidavits submitted at the last moment to the District Court. 
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SITLA moved to strike the affidavits (R. 1340-1362, 1366-1420) because they were 
either hearsay, or involved factual claims that had not been identified in Cook's initial 
disclosures or discovery responses. The District Court correctly ignored the affidavits, 
finding that the dispositive question was one of law - whether SITLA was entitled, 
pursuant to the plain meaning of Paragraph 11, to adjust Lease rent based on the fair 
market value of the land under Lease. The Court found that Paragraph 11 was facially 
unambiguous, allowing it to disregard as moot Cook's claims of parol evidence to the 
contrary. It therefore found SITLA's motions to strike moot (R. 2077). 
SITLA is at something of a loss in responding to Cook's various theories of the 
case, since Cook's arguments have radically changed from pleading to pleading over the 
course of the case. Cook's Docketing Statement and Brief state that the only issue on 
appeal is whether "the trial court err[ed] in detennining that as a matter of law SITLA did 
not commit an anticipatory breach of its 49 year lease with Cook Associates." Cook 
Brief at p. vii. Anticipatory repudiation was never pleaded in the complaint in this action, 
although Cook included the claim in its Motion for Summary Judgment. The District 
Court ruled on the claim because it, like other claims Cook did assert in its complaint, the 
claim was derivative of the core legal issue - the manner in which SITLA may adjust rent 
pursuant to Paragraph 11. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that anticipatory breach occurs when a party to 
an executory contract manifests a positive and unequivocal intent to not render its 
promised performance when the time fixed for it in the contract arrives. Hurwitz v. 
David K. Richards Co., 436 P.2d 794, 796 (Utah 1968). Cook alleges a variety of 
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alleged bad acts by SITLA that it claims constitute anticipatory repudiation; e.g. that 
SITLA indicated that it would be raising rent to reflect current fair market value (that 
admittedly would raise rents greatly, given the huge increase in land values in northern 
Utah County since 1978 as the area urbanized), told potential investors that the lease 
would likely terminate for this reason, and began marketing the lands for development in 
anticipation of such termination. 
Although SITLA would hotly dispute Cook's allegations concerning these issues 
were the case to be tried, for purposes of summary judgment they can be accepted 
arguendo. Even so, SITLA is entitled to summary judgment. In its Order, the District 
Court stated: "Cook's claim for anticipatory repudiation fails because the Court finds that 
under the Lease, the rental rate is to be adjusted on the basis of fair market value, without 
regard to Cook's use of the land" (R. 2150), and "The Court declares the proper 
interpretation of the rental price to be that of the fair market value of the property without 
regard to an underlying leasehold interest. That being a proper lease right, the Court 
dismisses Plaintiffs claim for anticipatory repudiation" (R. 2078). The Court's 
determination was correct as a matter of law, because SITLA was acting within the lease, 
which granted a right of rental adjustment as the State saw reasonably fit. In this case, 
SITLA did not contravene its promised performance, a prerequisite of anticipatory or 
other breach. The District Court similarly and correctly disposed of Cook's other 
derivative claims for breach of covenants of good faith and fair dealing and quiet 
enjoyment on the same basis - SITLA was acting within the contract when it indicated to 
Cook that it would readjust the Lease based on market value. 
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Finally, the Court of Appeals should note undisputed evidence that Cook's 
allegations that Cook's operations were disrupted by SITLA's actions to adjust lease 
rentals, in violation of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, are unsupportable. Well 
prior to the supposed "bad acts" of SITLA, the undisputed facts show that Cook's 
business on the site had entirely ceased, and Cook had filed what was determined to be a 
no-asset bankruptcy. In these circumstances, SITLA could not be found, as a matter of 




THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT SITLA IS ENTITLED, 
UPON EXERCISE OF THE RENTAL ADJUSTMENT OPTION PROVIDED FOR 
IN PARAGRAPH 11, TO OBTAIN A "FAIR MARKET VALUE" RETURN ON 
THE LAND SUBJECT TO THE LEASE, 
A. Cook's Interpretation of the Lease Is Not Supported By the Lease Language. 
The core argument advanced by Cook is that Paragraph 11 of the lease, which 
allows periodic rental adjustments as "reasonably necessary in the best interests of the 
State", constrains the rental value of the land to, variously, Cook's actual uses of the land 
leased; the value by which Cook as lessee is benefited under the Lease; or the State's 
administrative costs. The problem with Cook's argument is that it has no basis in the 
actual language used in the Lease. Under established principles of contract interpretation, 
a party's competing interpretation of contractual language may be accepted only if that 
interpretation is reasonably supported by the language of the contract. Dairies v. Vincent, 
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2008 UT 51, p i , 190 P. 3d 1269, 1277 (Utah 2008), citing Ward v. Intermountain 
Farmer's Ass 'n, 907 P. 2d 264 (Utah 1995). If the contract is in writing and the language 
is not ambiguous, the intention of the parties must be determined from the words of the 
agreement. Level 3 Communications, LLC v. Public Service Commission and Qwest 
Corporation, 163 P.3d 652, 655 (Utah App. 2007); also See Rainford v. Rytting, 451 P.2d 
769 (Utah 1969). There can be no ambiguity where evidence is offered to obscure 
otherwise plain contractual terms. Id. Nor can language be deemed ambiguous simply 
because the parties have a different interpretation; the claim must be "plausible and 
reasonable in light of the language used." Id., citing First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. 
Ranch, Inc., 966 P. 2d 834, 837 (Utah 1998). A contract provision is not ambiguous just 
because one party gives that provision a different meaning than another party does. 
Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assoc, 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988). 
The District Court correctly approached the issue of lease interpretation. It found 
no support in the language of the contract that would limit adjusted rents to the value of 
the lands as used by Cook, rather than full fair market value (R. 2079). Paragraph 11 
clearly allows the State to readjust as "Lessor shall deem" reasonably necessary in the 
best interests of the State. The adjustment provision was not facially ambiguous, and the 
Court found as a matter of law that a proposed adjustment on the basis of fair market 
value would not constitute a breach of the contract. Id. 
B. Cook's Unreasonableness Argument Should Not Be Considered. 
Cook argues that the substantial increase in rentals that would have occurred in 
connection with the 2008 readjustment violated Paragraph 11 because it was 
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unreasonable and not in the best interests of the State to adopt an interpretation that 
would render his lease meaningless through the State's ability to raise rents at will. Cook 
Brief at 12-14. An initial problem with this argument is Cook chose to pursue a legal 
remedy that precluded use of established administrative remedies to address his claims. 
After SITLA chose to adjust rentals under Paragraph 11 in 2004, Cook appealed 
administratively to the SITLA Board of Trustees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 53C-1-304, 
challenging the timeliness of SITLA's decision to adjust, which under the five year 
readjustment provision had vested in 2003 (R.0322-0325). Cook prevailed in this appeal, 
meaning that under Paragraph 11 SITLA was not entitled to adjust rentals again until 
2008. Rather than paying rent at the prevailing low rate until then, and appealing the 
reasonableness of any adjustment at that time, Cook filed this litigation in 2006 - several 
years in advance of the adjustment - claiming that SITLA's statements of intent to 
readjust the lease to market value in 2008 were in themselves a breach of the Lease 
(although, interestingly, he did not argue anticipatory breach at that time). The actual 
adjustment in 2008 took place after the pleadings had been closed in this litigation. Cook 
failed either to appeal that decision administratively or pay the revised rent, with the 
result that the Lease subsequently terminated. Had Cook appealed, it would have been 
free to argue the reasonableness of any adjustment, in accordance with the specific 
language of Paragraph 11. It chose not to do so. The Court of Appeals need not consider 
Cook's arguments concerning the reasonableness of the proposed increase, since Cook 
failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies in this regard. See Utah Code 
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Ann. § 63G-4-401 (2008) (exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite of 
judicial review). 
C. Adjustment of the Lease Rental Was Contemplated by the Lease and Legally 
Permissible, 
The fact that readjustment could be based on changes in market value after the 
lease was executed does not make such an adjustment invalid. Even if a contractual 
provision is not "immediately capable of definitive determination," that does not 
necessarily make the provision unenforceable." Plateau Mining Company v. Utah Div, of 
State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 725 (Utah 1990). In that case, a state mineral 
lease allowed adjustment of mineral royalty rates based on subsequent changes in federal 
royalty rates applicable to comparable federal lands. The Utah Supreme Court allowed 
enforcement of the provision, since setting future payments based on "market value" was 
a practicable method of setting value. 
In this case, there is a well-defined, practicable method for setting the amount of 
adjusted rentals. The State has a statutory and constitutional mandate to obtain not less 
than fair market value for the use of school trust assets. Utah Code Ann. §53C-1-302(2) 
(1997). For leases of state trust lands, this statutory directive is implemented by Utah 
Admin. Code R. 850-30-400. This rule requires lease rates to be based on fair market 
value, as determined by the agency based on return on land value or comparable lease 
data. R. 850-30-400(1). The rule also requires periodic review of the lease rentals, and 
provides direction as to how adjustments are calculated. Utah Admin. Code R. 850-30-
400(5) provides: 
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(b) Adjustments in base rentals may be based upon changes in 
market value including appreciation of the subject properties, 
changes in established indices, or other methods which may be 
appropriate and in the best interest of the trust beneficiaries. 
Any decision to adjust rentals under the rule is subject to administrative appeal and 
subsequent judicial review by the lessee pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 53C-1-304(2) 
(2006), although as noted above Cook did not pursue this remedy. 
Cook argues that R. 850-30-400(5) may not be applied to the Lease because it was 
not enacted at the time that the Lease was originally entered in 1978. As an initial matter, 
this argument does not affect the right of the State to make periodic discretionary 
adjustments in the lease rentals under Paragraph 11; the Lease unquestionably authorizes 
these adjustments, while the rule clarifies how they are to be implemented. At all 
relevant times, the State through its designee (DSL&F, now SITLA) has had: "full power 
and authority to prescribe necessary rules and regulations to accomplish its purposes and 
objectives as set out by statute . .." McKnight v. State Land Board, 381 P.2d 726, 731 
(Utah 1963). The administrative rules of SITLA and DSL&F have made "market value" 
the touchstone of lease rentals and adjustments. Cf. Utah Admin. Code R632-30-4 (1990) 
("The division shall receive at least fair market value for surface leases"); Utah Admin. 
Code R. 850-30-400 (2007) ("Adjustments in base rentals may be based in changes in 
market value including appreciation of the subject properties..."). The administrative 
code constrains the agency's discretion in making the determination of fair market value. 
It may use an index created by the agency to measure inflation in land values. Id. It may 
also consider appreciation through appraising the underlying land, and applying a rate of 
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return based on the prime rate. Id. Rule R. 850-30-400(5)(b) specifically provides that 
the method of determining the adjustment "may be based upon...the cost effectiveness of 
performing the review." Id. 
The State's obligation to manage school trust lands and derive full benefit to the 
trust existed long before the execution of the Lease in 1978. In 1965, the Utah Supreme 
Court emphasized that the State, through its agencies and officers, must manage the state 
trust lands in the most "prudent and profitable manner possible." Colman v. Utah State 
LandBd., 403 P.2d 781, 783 (Utah 1965). As such, Cook entered into the Lease with 
DSL&F with notice of, and subject to, the law governing school trust lands. Cook cannot 
now claim that the Lease is not subject to the laws in existence at the time the Lease was 
created. 
This interpretation is consistent with case law from other states construing rental 
readjustment clauses. In Bullock's, Inc. v. Security-First Natl Bank, 325 P.2d 185 (Cal. 
App. 1958), a declaratory relief action to determine the value of property for the purpose 
of setting new adjusted rental payments, the word "value" as used in the lease was held to 
mean the property's worth based on highest and best use rather than its utility for the use 
as leased. Cases which value the lease itself are clearly distinguishable. As the Court in 
Bullock ys, Inc. points out: 
The rule contended for is wholly impractical, for the reason 
that, as long as the net annual rent is unknown, the net value 
of the reversion cannot be ascertained, one of the necessary 
elements for fixing such value being lacking. No such plan for 
fixing the rentals could have been anticipated by the parties. 
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325 P.2d at 287 (emphasis added). This, of course, is why Cook can articulate no basis 
for any rental adjustment beyond the "4-5000" amount paid by Cook for the last twenty 
years (R. 0289). The value of the leasehold estate is a function of the rent, not the other 
way around. 
In Eltinge and Graziadio Development Co. v. Childs, 49 Cal. App. 3d 294 (Cal 
App.1975), also a declaratory action to interpret a rental readjustment clause in a ground 
lease, the court held that the lease when read as a whole was intended to return to the 
lessors a fixed percentage return on the value of the land appraised as to its "highest and 
best use" or "market worth," and not "value in use." Id. 
In this case, there is no question that the parties agree that "fair market value" is 
intended. Cook conceded in the 2004 administrative proceeding that the State was 
entitled to market value (R. 0456-0458). The question is whether "fair market value" 
represents the "value in use" by Cook or the "highest and best use" of the trust asset. The 
Lease does not contain any provision for value in use, but rather references the "best 
interest of the State". Since Utah law requires the State to seek " . . . the greatest possible 
monetary return for the school and institutional trusts", National Parks and Conservation 
Association v. State Lands Board, 869 P.2d 909, 922 (Utah 1993), it is reasonable to 
assume that SITLA is entitle to adjust rents to reflect the actual, unencumbered fair 
market value of the lands. 
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II. 
INADMISSIBLE PAROL EVIDENCE AT THE DISTRICT COURT LEVEL 
REMAINS INADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE ON APPEAL 
In connection with the parties' cross-motions for Summary Judgment, Cook 
submitted affidavits from Dee Atkin and Thaddeus Speed purporting to show that SITLA 
employees had stated to third parties that rent on the subject property would be increased 
at the next periodic adjustment to the point that Cook's business would be unviable, and 
that no further investment should be made into the premises. Cook Brief, Statement of 
Facts fflf 6, 18, 19, 26. The affidavits were filed after the close of discovery, during 
which Cook had failed to identify either Messrs. Speed or Atkin as potential fact 
witnesses (R. 1366-1420). At the same (late) date, Cook also submitted an affidavit from 
Merrill Cook alleging that a now long-dead state employee had told him at lease 
inception in 1978 that rents would never be increased disproportionately to increases in 
DSL&F's overhead. The relevant portions of Merrill Cook's affidavit were comprised 
purely of hearsay (R. 1340-1362). SITLA moved to strike the inadmissible evidence (R. 
1340-1362, 1366-1420). The District Court, finding that SITLA had properly exercised 
its rights under the Lease to raise rents to market value, determined that SITLA's 
Motions to Strike were moot (R. 2077). However, Cook now incorporates the 
inadmissible evidence in its Brief as if such evidence had been properly admitted from 
the outset. 
As detailed in SITLA's Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion to Strike 
the Affidavits of Dee G. Atkin and Thaddeus Speed, dated May 22, 2008, Cook failed to 
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disclose, as required by Rules 26(a), 26(e), and 33 Utah R. Civ. P., the identities of Mr. 
Atkin and Mr. Speed despite numerous discovery requests and efforts on the part of 
SITLA to obtain their identities and the information contained in the affidavits, either in 
the pre-trial disclosures or during the discovery period (R. 1366-1420). Cook did not 
defend this attempt to insert inadmissible evidence by showing good cause or harmless 
error for the failure to disclose, as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 37(f) (R. 1664-1730, 1731-
1785, 1975-2052). 
While the District Court ruled the Motions to Strike were moot, its determination 
does not transform inadmissible evidence into admissible evidence available to Cook on 
appeal. Facts comprising inadmissible evidence in the District Court are also 
inadmissible in an appeal reviewing the District Court's grant of summary judgment. See 
Pipkin v. Haugen, 2003 UT App 216 (Utah App.) (affirming the district court's grant of 
summary judgment where opposing party's affidavit did not provide facts supported by 
admissible evidence.); also see Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983). 
Cook's Brief is peppered with the inadmissible evidence and unsupported facts or 
innuendo alluding to the existence of such facts. See Cook Brief at pp. 1, 12, 19 and 23; 
also see Facts 6, 18 and 19. The inadmissible evidence is neither material nor relevant to 
the issue of law decided by the District Court. Cook's insertion of such facts to rewrite 
the record before the District Court or to create a new cause of action should be 
disregarded. Also see Peterson v. Coca Cola USA, 2002 UT 42, [^20, 48 P.3d 941 
(upholding trial court's grant of summary judgment where opposing party "offered 
nothing more than unsupported allegations.") (quoting Thornock v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934, 
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936 (Utah 1979)). "The court must view all facts and inferences in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, but it may not assume facts for which no evidence is 
offeredr Peterson, 2002 UT at ^20, 48 P.3d 941 (emphasis added) (holding that 
"Allegations or denials in the pleadings are not a sufficient basis for opposing summary 
judgment") (quoting Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224, 227-228 (1983)). The "facts" 
raised by these affidavits may properly be disregarded by the Court of Appeals. 
III. 
COOK'S CLAIMS FOR BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD 
FAITH AND FAIR DEALING FAIL AS A MATTER OF LAW, BECAUSE SITLA 
WAS ENTITLED TO ADJUST MARKET RENTALS TO FAIR MARKET VALUE. 
A. The "Bad Acts" Alleged by Cook Are Not Legally Relevant 
Cook's brief includes allegations of a variety of acts by SITLA employees that 
Cook claims constitute evidence of bad faith by SITLA employees that collectively 
breached the contractual covenants of good faith and fair dealing. These include the 
allegations described in Section II above that SITLA staff purportedly told investors that 
they intended to raise rents sufficiently to get Cook off the property; that SITLA 
commissioned development plans for the property and marketed it to outside investors; 
that SITLA did not allow Cook to share in development proceeds from the lands; and that 
SITLA informed Cook in advance of its intent to raise the rent to much higher levels. As 
discussed in Section II above, these "facts" are largely inadmissible hearsay, and need not 
be considered by the Court of Appeals in determining if summary judgment was 
appropriate. Yet even were the Court to accept these allegations as true, the State would 
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still be entitled to summary judgment, because the legal elements necessary to show a 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing have not been demonstrated. 
B. The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Cannot Be Used to Supersede the 
Express Language of the Contract 
Parties to a contract are deemed to intend that the contractual terms be construed 
in a manner which assumes the parties intended that the duties and rights created by the 
contract should be performed and executed in good faith. Such a covenant cannot be 
construed, however, to establish new, independent rights or duties not agreed upon by the 
parties. Nor can a covenant of good faith be used to nullify a right granted by contract to 
one of the parties or to require a party vested with a contract right to exercise that right in 
a manner contrary to that party's legitimate self-interest. Brehany v. Nordstrom, 812 
P.2d 49, 55 (Utah 1991), discussing Rio Algom Corp. v. JIMCO, 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 
1980). The implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not create 
any rights or duties inconsistent with the express terms of the contract. Oakwood Village 
LLC v. Albertsons, 104 P.3d 1226, 1240 (Utah 2004). The implied covenant of good 
faith cannot be used to create a new provision that was not previously agreed upon. 
Under Paragraph 11 of the Lease, SITLA had the right to raise rents to reflect 
current market values, to the extent that it deemed it necessary in the reasonable interests 
of the State. To the extent Cook asserted SITLA breached the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing due to SITLA's intent to exercise its option pursuant to Paragraph 11 and 
adjust the rent based on a determination of fair market value, such intent is not a breach 
of any provision of the Lease (R. 0274-0277). Rather, this act represents the intent to 
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exercise a Lease term. A contractual party cannot assert breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing in order to "nullify a right granted by contract to one of the 
parties . . . " Brehany, 812 P.2d at 55. There is no Lease provision that authorizes any 
other manner of rental adjustment. Even if, as alleged by Cook, there were statements of 
"mutual agreement to raise rent at 5-year intervals . . . to cover the additional cost of 
administration spread over all Trust Land lease," the statue of frauds will not allow the 
agreement to be orally modified (R. 0274-0277). As such, the District Court correctly 
concluded that SITLA's intent to exercise a contract right cannot create a breach of good 
faith; such claim fails to state a cause of action. 
There is no question that readjustment based on fair market value in 2008 would 
have led to an extremely large increase in rentals under the lease, due to the equally 
substantial, indeed exponential, increase in land values in the Lehi area as the area 
transformed from a distant rural location in 1978 to the urban/suburban community that it 
is today. This indeed was the purpose of Paragraph 11 - to allow the school trust to 
receive ongoing fair market value for its lands through periodic rental adjustments as its 
lands increased in value. It was not bad faith for SITLA to state the obvious — that 
market rentals would be increasing, and that this would likely preclude continuation of 
the lease as a practical matter. Nor under this circumstance would exploring future 
options for the marketing and development of the property after the likely tennination of 
the lease. Finally, Cook had no contractual right to share in the appreciation of the 
property or its post-lease development, although this was what he sought from SITLA 
during the relevant period (R. 0290). SITLA's refusal to accept such a proposal does not 
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breach any contractual right and thus, no implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has 
been breached. "[W]e will not interpret the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing to make a better contract for the parties than they made for themselves." Brown 
v. Moore, 973 P.2d 950, 954 (Utah 1998). 
IV. 
THE COVENANT OF QUIET ENJOYMENT WAS NOT BREACHED 
A. The Elements of a Breach Were Not Present Because Cook Was Not 
Constructively Evicted. 
Cook's brief argues that SITLA breached the covenant of quiet enjoyment inherent 
in the lease by purportedly engaging in preemptive marketing of the property, and refusing 
to confirm to investors the terms that Cook ascribes to the lease (e.g. no rental adjustments 
based on market value would be made). Cook Brief at 10. In the District Court, Cook 
asserted that the acts constituting SITLA's breach of this covenant included: (1) Cook's 
successful 2004 appeal of agency action concerning timeliness of notice to exercise the 
rental readjustment clause (R. 0298-0319); (2) the agency's counsel's letter of July 2005, 
informing Cook of SITLA's future intent to exercise its option to readjust ground rent to fair 
market value (R. 0295); and (3) the agency's alleged attempt or attempts to negotiate a sale 
of the Subject Property subject to the Lease (R. 0291). Cook asserted that the acts 
constituted "non-stop harassment in trying to get Cook off the property and is thus an 
actionable interference with Cook's quiet enjoyment of the property" (R. 0277). Although 
Cook was unable to provide any facts to support these conclusions, for the purpose of its 
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Summary Judgment motion, SITLA assumed arguendo that: (1) Cook's allegations 
constituted facts and (2) these facts are true (R. 0221-0250 and 0253-0285). 
Even so, SITLA was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. In order to 
show a breach of the covenant, the landlord's wrongful conduct must be shown to have 
created a substantial and permanent "constructive eviction." This requires that the 
interference with the tenant's quiet enjoyment of the premises must be so injurious that the 
premises become entirely unfit for the demised purpose. See Brugger v. Fonoti, 645 P.2d 
647 (Utah 1982); Thirteenth & Washington Sts. Corp. v. Neslen, 254 P.2d 847 (Utah 1953); 
Barker v. Utah Oil Ref. Co., 178 P.2d 386, 387-88 (Utah 1947); Tregoning v. Reynolds, 28 
P.2d 79 (Cal. App. 1934); Shindler v. Grove Hall Kosher Delicatessen & Lunch, Inc., 184 
N.E. 673 (Mass. 1933); see also 2 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property Sec. 232(1) 
(1994). Most importantly, and dispositive of this case, Cook did not abandon the premises. 
Abandonment is an essential element of the cause of action. See Richard Barton 
Enterprises, Inc. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368 (Utah 1996). 
The case of Gray v. Oxford Worldwide Group, Inc., 139 P.3d 267 (Utah App 2006) 
is illustrative of the high level of interference necessary to support a claim of breach of the 
covenant of quiet enjoyment. The tenant was subject to ongoing ethnic prejudice against 
Latinos at their business of providing language training to Latino members of the LDS 
Church. The trial court found that there had been verbal harassment of both the tenants and 
their customers which had culminated in a call to the police reporting underage drinking at a 
tenant sponsored function where the invited guests included members of the BYU faculty, 
Governor Leavitt, and other dignitaries. The call to the police was made despite assurances 
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that the fiesta was a non-alcohol event. The tenant's customers, of whom 90% were LDS, 
were embarrassed and traumatized by the wrongfully motivated harassment to the point of 
making the tenant's business commercially unfeasible; this resulted in the tenant shutting its 
doors and vacating the demised premises shortly thereafter. Nothing remotely approaching 
this type of conduct is alleged in this case, particularly since SITLA acted within the scope 
and intent of the Lease. 
B. The Undisputed Evidence Before the District Court Showed that Cook's 
Failure Was Entirely Unrelated to the State's Actions, 
As noted above, SITLA's actions in connection with the Cook lease were undertaken 
in compliance with the terms of the lease, and the obvious recognition that the highest and 
best use of the property had changed over the years. While SITLA makes a convenient 
whipping boy, the undisputed facts before the District Court do not remotely support a 
claim that SITLA substantially interfered with Cook's quiet enjoyment of the Subject 
Property, resulting in constructive eviction. When premises are leased for a commercial 
purpose, the lessor may demonstrate that interference was not substantial by demonstrating 
that the lessee's normal business operations were not unduly affected. See Joseph v. Hustad 
Corp., 454 P.2d 916 (Mont. 1969). SITLA's "bad acts" allegedly occurred between 2004 
and 2005. By this point in time, Cook's ship had been sunk by causes totally unrelated to 
SITLA. Cook's business had failed due to industry competition, its financing had been 
withdrawn, litigation against third party creditors had failed, it had filed for bankruptcy, and 
the bankruptcy had been dismissed on the basis that Cook had no assets (R. 0537-0543). 
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Under these circumstances, no credible claim that SITLA's actions constructively evicted 
Cook is sustainable. 
Cook claimed in the District Court that the company was unable to obtain financing 
or attract new customers as a result of the SITLA's statements in 2002, and from 2004 
through 2006, to others regarding Cook's status on the Subject Property (R. 0274, 0277-
0278). Even assuming arguendo these hearsay assertions are admissible and true, there was 
no change in the business practices or income at the Lehi plant located on the Subject 
Property during this time (R. 0281-0283). The company last applied for and was rejected 
for a loan in 2002, prior to any of the alleged acts (R. 0215-0218, 0281 -0282). The Lehi 
plant employed fewer than 5 full time employees per year since 1985, with the exception of 
1995 during which the plant employed 6 full time employees (R. 0281-0282). Since 1985, 
the Lehi plant has netted an annual profit of over $10,000 on only three occasions and 
suffered losses on nine occasions. Cook attributed these losses as "[mjostly a result of mine 
shutdowns and mine slowdowns. The slowdown in the Wyoming and other intermountain 
states' coal mines from 1983-1985 is well documented" (R. 0243-0244). Cook again 
pointed to a struggling mining industry to largely explain the company's loss of its repeat-
customers (R. 0235-0238, 0242-0244). Other notable reasons for this loss of customer base 
included aggressive competitors and closures of the Lehi plant. "Dyno and Orica became 
very aggressive in buying distributors that were buying Cook products. Dyno and Orica 
then forced them to stop buying from Cook" (R. 0235-0238, 0242-0244). Finally, the 
closure in 1999 of Cook's Gilbert plant, which serviced the company's "two largest 
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customers (LTV Steel Mining and Hibbing Taconite)," contributed to the failure of the 
business: 
In 1999, Cook lost out in a single source bid sent out by the 
Cleveland Cliffs Corporation when a new purchasing VP was 
hired in Cleveland. In spite of twenty years of excellent 
product and service amounting to over 50 million pounds sold 
to Cleveland Cliffs' mines in Minnesota, Cook lost out to 
Dyno's Minnex subsidiary. There had been an issue in 1999 
with one poor loading at the LTV Steel Mining Company (out 
of hundreds of loadings) which Cook attributes to low PH 
[sic] off spec ammonium nitrate delivered by Potash Corp of 
Saskatchewan (PCS). 
(R. 0235-0238, 0242-0244). 
In 2001, Cook unsuccessfully sued PCS Sales, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Utah (R. 0377-0400). In the court's Memorandum of Opinion Granting 
PCS's Motion for Summary Judgment, the court cited a business communication from 
Cook to PCS dated April 6, 1999, wherein Cook stated the following: 
(1) Due to "predatory pricing practices on the part of competitors and 
overvaluation of raw material prices on the part of suppliers," Cook "has been 
forced to close its doors;" 
(2) Cook "is unable to pay 100% of what it currently owes its creditors;" and 
(3) Cook is "forced to settle with those it owes money at less than the credited 
amounts." 
(R. 0397). After Cook lost to PCS, Cook filed for bankruptcy in 2003 in the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Court, District of Minnesota, pursuant to Chapter 11 of Title 11 of the U.S. 
Code (R. 0339-0374). The bankruptcy court dismissed the case, finding in favor of the 
U.S. Trustee, who concluded that Cook "has no ability to pay its administrative expenses 
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in this case" and "[t]he inability of the Debtor to secure insurance appears to be on 
account of the lack of funds" (R. 0335). 
Cook's Bankruptcy Petition claimed the company received no income in 2000, 2001 
and 2002. Id. The estate could not even pay insurance for the leased premises (R. 0409-
0422, 0331-0336). Cook's discovery responses, though somewhat at odds with its 
Bankruptcy pleadings, tell the same story and demonstrate that although there may have 
been some source of income, it was less than $5,000.00 annually, and not a product of 
income generated due to manufacturing operations at the Lehi Plant (R. 0242). 
Only after Cook's bankruptcy case was dismissed did Cook point the finger of 
blame at SITLA as the cause of the company's failure. Whatever Cook's motivation, the 
undisputed facts set forth in the record demonstrate that SITLA's actions did not 
substantially interfere with Cook's ability to quietly enjoy its leasehold interest to conduct 
the business of explosives manufacturing (R. 0537-0543). That business was dead well 
before the alleged SITLA acts that that Cook complains of. Cook's claim of breach of the 
covenant of quiet enjoyment can be dismissed as a matter of law for this reason as well. 
V. 
COOK'S CLAIM OF INVERSE CONDEMNATION FAILS TO IDENTIFY A 
GOVERNMENTAL ACTION AND THUS, FAILS TO STATE A CAUSE OF 
ACTION. 
The District Court also found Cook's claim of inverse condemnation failed to state a 
claim for a taking. Cook asserted that SITLA "has effectuated a taking as a result of its 
overt actions to take away Plaintiffs leasehold interest" (R. 0289). 
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Pursuant to the Utah Code, a "taking" is: 
a governmental action that results in a taking of private 
property so that compensation to the owner of the property is 
required by: (a) the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States; or (b) Utah Constitution 
Article I, Section 22. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-90-2(1) (1997) (renumbered 2008). There is no dispute that Cook's 
leasehold interest constitutes a property interest. However, under Utah law there is: (1) 
no governmental action; and (2) no taking of this property interest. 
Cook asserted that SITLA interfered with its reasonable investment backed 
expectations and depleted the value of Cook's leasehold interest by virtue of SITLA's 
attempts to raise the rent pursuant to Paragraph 11 and by the alleged "threats by STILA 
(sic) since 2002 to kick Cook off the property[,] mak[ing] it very difficult to get 
financing, to get investors, to get partners, and, particularly, to get customers for its 
blasting products produced at the plant" (R. 0273-0274, 0276-0277). As discussed 
above, Cook's leasehold interest remained intact during the course of the Lease, as did 
the company's ability to conduct its business, such as it was, on the Subject Property. 
Long before SITLA took any action, there simply was no business there, Cook having 
gone entirely out of business. 
Moreover, the claim fails due to the absence of any government action as defined 
by statute. Cook alleged government action based on SITLA's position as "a state 
organization" and SITLA's attempt to exercise a contract provision "to fix the rents at 
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some value that does not account for the use of the property as an explosives site" (R. 
0273). These acts do not constitute government action as defined by the Utah Code: 
"Governmental action" or "action" does not mean. . . school 
and institutional trust land management activities and disposal 
of land and interests in land conducted pursuant to Title 53C, 
Schools and Institutional Trust Lands Management Act. 
Utah Code Ann. §63-90-2(2)(b)(iv) (1997) (renumbered 2008). The activities Cook 
alleged constitute governmental action are management activities concerning the 
disposition of an interest in school trust lands, which the Utah legislature has specifically 
excluded from the definition of governmental action for takings purposes. Where the 
basis for the inverse condemnation claim rests on an action that does not constitute 
governmental action, there can be no taking. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court correctly concluded that Paragraph 11 of the Lease allows 
periodic readjustments of the rental rate to assure return of fair market value to the state 
school trust based on the highest and best use of the land. The alternate interpretations of 
Paragraph 11 advanced by Cook are not supported by the plain language of the Lease. 
Since the Lease permits the adjustments contemplated by the State, Cook's derivative 
claims of anticipatory repudiation, breach of the covenants of good faith and fair dealing 
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and quiet enjoyment, and regulatory takings, were also correctly dismissed as a matter of 
law. The Court of Appeals should therefore affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals. 
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